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ONE BELT ONE ROAD – HOW DOES IT AFFECT THE EURASIAN 
ECONOMIC AND SECURITY ISSUE
Aleksandar PETROVSKI1 
Nenad TANESKI2 
Abstract: China has long posited that common security can be improved through economic 
development and cooperation. Infrastructure, in turn, is one of the essential foundations of 
economic development and cooperation—no economically prosperous state has been able 
to progress without it. As the Chinese people say ‘if you want to be rich, first build a road’. 
China’s “One Belt, One Road” project is comprised of two components: the Maritime Silk 
Road Initiative (MSRI) and the Silk Road Economic Belt (SREB)—that were announced 
separately in 2013. Each component has the potential to transform the global geopolitical 
landscape through the construction of interrelated infrastructure projects including ports, 
highways, railways and pipelines.
Large parts of Asia have a critical lack of basic infrastructure such as roads, rail tracks, 
bridges, airports and power grids, which current national and multilateral developmen-
tal institutions are unable to address. The MSRI is a geopolitical project that involves a 
number of actors (governments, private companies and Chinese state-owned enterprises) at 
a number of geographic scales (cities, provinces, states and continents). It is an ambitious 
multi-decade vision to physically, digitally and culturally connect Eurasia, pursue closer 
Eurasian economic cooperation and mitigate poverty. This grand vision has become the pil-
lar of President Xi Jinping administration’s foreign policy.
The EU and China both have an interest in promoting greater connectivity and stability in 
Eurasia. In China’s case, this is largely achieved through its visionary Belt and Road Initia-
tive (BRI). So far, the EU has given the initiative a welcome and is still thoughtful how to 
engage it strategically. This is partly because the BRI remains operationally uncoordinated, 
and the EU remains concerned about commercial feasibility, transparency, sustainability and 
environmental issues.
Moreover, the differences in needs, interests and strategic planning among EU member states 
in relation to China slow down their common response. While the EU’s cautious approach 
could certainly lead to a more well-informed and gauged response, an overly long delay may 
come at the risk of the EU being left behind as China takes a stronger lead in shaping the 
Eurasian security.
Key words: China, economy, EU, security, belt, road.
Introduction
Connectivity, including infrastructure, projects have long been recognized as an integral 
element of global political and economic change, as well as a reflection of new political and 
1  The Author is Professor at the Military Academy “General Mihailo Apostolski”-Skopje
2  The Author is Professor at the Military Academy “General Mihailo Apostolski”-Skopje
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economic realities. Many have started to consider the political and economic implications of 
the MSRI and SREB for China’s economy, provinces and cities and multinational corporations 
(MNCs), the geo-political and geo-economics order in the Asia-Pacific Region, Central Asia, 
South Asia, global power structures, and patterns of investment, trade and people-to-people 
exchange regionally and globally. 
However, the EU first requires a more comprehensive understanding of the Belt’s strategic 
implications in their totality - and how they might relate to its own security and foreign policy 
objectives. There exists a vast vacuum of critical infrastructure in large parts of Eurasia, which 
many relevant states are not able to fill, even with the aid of existing multilateral development 
funds. The Belt intends to fill much of this vacuum, and while the political endurance of the 
initiative and the efficacy of its implementation remains to be seen, it has been received with 
enthusiasm throughout many parts of Eurasia. It has the potential to become a leading model 
of bilateral and multilateral economic cooperation in Eurasia. 
But what is clear is that the Belt is driven by a wide range of motivations, including en-
hancing China’s domestic economic security by increasing its global economic and, particularly, 
financial clout, mitigating security threats, and garnering strategic space. Political tensions and 
the Silk Road economic belt disorder within Eurasian states may impact the Belt, but the Belt 
itself also interacts mutually with these dynamics. For now Belt does not structurally conflict 
with Russian security or Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) objectives, whether nationally or 
in Central Asia.
EU economic and security interests 
First of all, we know that Silk Road Economic Belt touches a number of EU 
foreign and security priorities, including global governance, state-societal resilience 
and cooperation among regional orders. Second, it is largely in line with the EU in-
terests in Central and South Asia, although the implications for the EU normative and 
value-based agenda remain in question. Third, it has at this stage, limited prospects as 
a platform for EU–China hard security cooperation, but it does offer greater coopera-
tion potential in relation to human security.
In coordination with the EU, it should strategically utilize opportunities to 
engage China and other relevant actors, and calibrate the Belt to contribute towards 
a ‘rules-based global order’ in line with its own interests and values. Then, it should 
think about forging closer strategic relationships with key stakeholders such as China, 
India and Russia in the interest of a more stable Eurasia, with the Belt as one possible 
impetus for this. Furthermore, it should think and plan more strategically about its own 
vision for a more secure Eurasia, and develop a more coherent position on Eurasian 
integration visions such as the Belt. And it will need to allocate greater institutional and 
human capital to continuously study and monitor the Belt and its political, economic 
and security implications.3
3  THE SILK ROAD ECONOMIC BELT Considering security implications and EU–China 
cooperation prospects, SIPRI 2018
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Picture 1. China project SREB and MSRI
The EU 2016 Global Strategy states that the EU will ‘pursue a coherent approach 
to China’s connectivity drives westwards’4. Overall, there needs to be greater integra-
tion of development as a core tenet of security, inclusion and stability within the EU’s 
regional engagement of South East Asian and IOR states. While this need not obviate 
the EU’s pursuit of democratic and human rights ideals, a failure to take better account 
of local demands and need for growth will leave the EU marginalized.
Greater EU attention to maritime security in the SCS and especially the IOR 
is firmly recommended as its relevance to economic and security interests cannot be 
overstated. In the SCS, China may through the Road gain the leverage to achieve its 
maritime claims over time, thereby possibly impacting the security of EU SLOCs. This 
is a red line and the EU is advised to engage with China, ASEAN and other stakehold-
ers to stress its concerns. In the IOR, the EU should utilize the emerging interplay 
and merger of maritime and terrestrial security spaces to its economic, diplomatic and 
security advantage.
The belt should contribute to a “global rule based on rules” in accordance with 
its own interests and values. Next, it should consider establishing closer strategic re-
lationships with key stakeholders such as China, India and Russia in the interest of a 
more stable Eurasia, with the Belt as a possible impetus. In turn, it needs to think and 
plan strategically for its vision of a safer Eurasia and to develop a more coherent posi-
tion on Eurasian integration visions such as the Belt. Greater institutional and human 
capital will need to be allocated for the continuous study and monitoring of the belt 
and its political, economic and security implications.
Eurasia’s geopolitical and geo-economics landscapes are in rapid transition. 
While actors such as China and Russia are initiating and stimulating their own regional 
integration efforts such as the Belt and the EEU, the EU is facing its own internal inte-
gration challenges and is also preoccupied with crises in its immediate neighborhood. 
4  European Union, ‘Shared vision, common action: a stronger Europe’, June 2016.
71
INTERNATIONAL SCIENTIFIC JOURNAL
CONTEMPORARY MACEDONIAN DEFENCE 
While this is underlined in the 2016 Global Strategy, a vision for Eurasia specifically is 
not delineated—a direct connection is made between the EU’s prosperity and security 
and Asian security. It is pivotal that the EU goes beyond the 2016 Global Strategy and 
more clearly delineates its vision for a more stable and secure Eurasia. This would need 
to incorporate its own strategic role in Eurasia, its views on Asian security architecture 
and its vision for governance vis-à-vis other important stakeholders, including not only 
the USA and China, but also India and Russia, middle powers, and local actors.5 China’s 
large-scale economic engagement in so many breakable, developing and even developed 
nations across Eurasia has important implications for global governance. Economic 
implications of the BRI are perhaps better understood, and the EU has already engaged 
with China through the EU–China Connectivity Platform on investment cooperation, 
which also provides the future possibility of joint investment in third countries. Devel-
opment means the greatest security and master key to regional security issues as one 
of the keys for the success of these concepts. Analysts are providing greater security 
and stability in Eurasia’s volatile regions, through the stimulation of economic growth 
and poverty reduction brought about by investment, trade and infrastructure provision. 
This means that it will need hard and soft infrastructure investment which will increase 
the economic and geostrategic stability in EU and Asia. 
The various EU interests in the One Belt and One Road Initiative
So far, the EU has given the initiative a lukewarm welcome and is still pondering 
how to engage it strategically. This is partly because the BRI remains operationally 
uncoordinated, and the EU remains concerned about commercial feasibility, transpar-
ency, sustainability and environmental issues.
But differences in needs, interests and strategic planning among EU member 
states in relation to China also hamper a common response. While the EU’s cautious 
approach could certainly lead to a more well-informed and gauged response, an overly 
long delay may come at the risk of the EU being left behind as China takes a stronger 
lead in shaping the Eurasian landscape.6
The BRI is China’s vision for comprehensive connectivity and economic coop-
eration, mostly focused on, but not limited to, the whole of Eurasia. The initiative has 
generated diverse degrees of interest throughout the EU. Member states in Central and 
Eastern Europe, as well as Greece, Portugal and Spain have mostly reacted enthusi-
astically to it. Given their own poor economies, these states have welcomed Chinese 
investment in large infrastructure projects, and they see Chinese investment as a way 
5  Reiterer, M., ‘Asia as part of the EU’s global security strategy: reflections on a more strategic 
approach’, LSE IDEAS, Dahrendorf Forum Special Report, Apr. 2016.
6  Richard Ghiasy and Jiayi Zhouhe EU: Pondering strategic engagement with China’s Belt and 
Road Initiative, SIPRI, May 2017.
72
INTERNATIONAL SCIENTIFIC JOURNAL
CONTEMPORARY MACEDONIAN DEFENCE 
to boost their local economies and employment.
In Italy, commercial prospects have led local business communities to take active 
steps towards engaging with the BRI, and at the national level the Italian Government 
itself is seemingly becoming more interested. Ahead of the Belt and Road Forum held 
in Beijing on 14–15 May 2017, Italian Prime Minister Paolo Gentiloni said that Italy 
is ‘enormously interested’ in the BRI.
France’s policy community interest in the BRI seems to have peaked already, 
although the incoming Macron administration could revisit the initiative. Many regional 
and municipal governments in Germany have indicated a strong desire to engage with 
China on the BRI, but at the national level the response has been more restrained. The 
German and Dutch Governments do not want to engage too closely without a better 
understanding of the BRI’s long-term strategic implications, and do not want to sideline 
the EU in the process. Nordic governments have so far not indicated much interest in 
the BRI, although interest in Denmark is starting to pick up.
At the supranational level, the EU has established together with China, the EU-
China Connectivity Platform, through which the two have agreed to cooperate on a 
number of investment projects within the EU and China. This has been the EU’s most 
progressive response to the initiative. But beyond this limited economic cooperation, the 
EU has not so far engaged with China’s BRI on a more strategic level, despite it having 
strategic implications for the EU’s political, economic and security interests abroad.
Both China and the EU see economic development as a pillar of stability, but 
their development support approaches differ. China has tended to emphasize physical 
infrastructure and no-strings-attached investment, while the EU has tended to promote 
institutional reform, good governance and rule of law as pre-conditions for inclusive 
economic growth. Both approaches are necessary but neither are alone sufficient to 
achieve sustainable development. And while these different approaches in theory are 
complementary, the EU emphasizes normative values such as human rights, democracy 
and civil society in a way that makes it more difficult for the two sides to engage in 
cooperation.
As the BRI unfolds over the next few years and decades, the EU needs to be 
aware that China’s BRI efforts and stepped-up presence in Eurasia will probably be a 
significant shaper of future regional governance in economic, financial, political and 
even security terms. As China’s overseas investments and economic footprint grows, 
so will its political and security presence. The Chinese naval base in Djibouti is one 
such example of how China’s overseas interests have evolved in recent years.
Geostrategic changes and blending security spaces
The EU is a stakeholder in Asia’s security and any major security incident in 
Asia would have serious implications for the EU’s economic and security interests. 
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More recently, the ASEAN and the EU have been facing common security challenges: 
from the increased investment in maritime connectivity to boosting regional trade with 
Asian countries.7
Therefore, the EU has been actively participating in the ARF on maritime security 
cooperation, which includes the improvement of maritime awareness, surveillance and 
information sharing, maintenance of peace and good order at sea, and the development 
of environmentally friendly ports.8
From 2018 until 2020, the EU will co-chair the ARF’s Inter-sectional Meeting 
on Maritime Security with Australia and Viet Nam, which will allow the EU to play 
a role as maritime security coordinator. Several ASEAN participants noted that they 
intend to pursue a process similar to the EUMSS as a medium to long-term goal.9
Such official activities reveal that while Asia-Pacific maritime security issues 
have not traditionally penetrated far into EU policies, the SCS is one of the few ex-
ceptions. This is understandable given the scale of EU member state trade traversing 
these waterways.10
The approach of celebratory economic initiatives and tools to geostrategic aims, 
which has been labeled as geo-economics, is hardly the sole preserve of China. Part of 
the reason why some have dubbed these activities neo-colonialist or mercantilist is that 
they smack of the tactics used by past empires. China’s own popular series from over 
a decade ago, (The rise of great powers), presaged this fascination with how countries 
emerge as global powers.11
China’s geopolitical and military aspirations are understandable, as explained 
in the first part, particularly given the growth of its markets and interests throughout 
the SCS and the IOR.
However, when these aims start to impinge on the sovereignty and sustainability 
of local stakeholders, and to conflict with core EU interests in maintaining flows of 
information, products and resources throughout these regions, there needs to be more 
than simply rhetoric in response. The Road, as with the Belt, advances through trial 
and error. As such, China may be receptive to revising those objectives that meet its 
core interests, and then at least some existing approaches if a combination of the right 
incentives and disincentives can be applied. One such example is the first Silk Road 
NGO Cooperation Network Forum, which was held in November 2017 and attended 
7  European  Commission, Joint Staff Working Document: Second report on the implementation 
of the EU 
Maritime Security Strategy Action Plan, Brussels, SWD (2017) 238 Final, 14 June 2017.
8  Gatpolintan, L., ‘ASEAN, EU to intensify maritime cooperation’, Philippine News Agency, 7 
Oct. 2017
9  European Commission.
10  Germany, $215 billion; the UK, $124 billion; France, $83.5 billion; and Italy, $70.5 billion in 
2016. Center for Strategic and International Studies, ‘How much trade transits the South China Sea?’, 
ChinaPower, n.d
11  [The rise of great powers], CNTV, Nov. 2006
74
INTERNATIONAL SCIENTIFIC JOURNAL
CONTEMPORARY MACEDONIAN DEFENCE 
by more than 200 NGO delegates from over 50 countries. Such a forum would have 
been unimaginable in the first three years of the BRI, which shows that with the right 
amount of practical initiatives and through dialogue, notable changes can be achieved.12
The EU Global Strategy states that the EU is seeking to serve as a credible political 
and security player in the region.13 From the Strategy, it is evident that South East Asia, 
and in particular the freedom of navigation and the SLOCs through the SCS, maintain 
a stronger hold on European consciousness than the Indian Ocean and its SLOCs. This 
is perhaps understandable because ASEAN and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) are 
more akin to the EU framework, whereas South Asia lacks a cohesive grouping even 
under the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC). Moreover, 
there have been frequent tensions in the SCS in recent years.
When observing the EU engagement with these two regions, its placement of 
China at the head of the chapter on Asia in the Global Strategy, combined with greater 
granularity on the EU-China Connectivity Platform, the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) 
and the ASEAN–EU frameworks, indicate where EU priorities lie. Nonetheless, the 
SCS and the IOR are interconnected maritime domains, and have a strong shared im-
pact on Europe’s intertwined economic and security interests. Certainly, the EU needs 
to start paying closer attention to maritime security and connectivity developments in 
the IOR. Indeed, EU security interests do not always coincide with those of the United 
States, and the EU may benefit from the opening up of the IOR maritime space and 
the merging with the Eurasian terrestrial security space. This may prove valuable to 
the EU in that it may improve the connectivity of and stimulate the development in 
Central Asia and South Asia. Central Asia’s pathway to the Indian Ocean will mostly 
depend on the stability in Iran and Pakistan through China. If successful, however, the 
massive landlocked region of Central Asia will finally be able to connect more easily 
with the world’s oceans and mitigate its dependence on Russian transit routes and Rus-
sian economy. South Asian intra- and extra-regional connectivity, currently in a dismal 
state, may also improve and expand markets that the EU could tap. From an economic 
perspective, the Road could thus be a positive impetus for growth. 
Following the official renaming by the US Department of Defense of US Pacific 
Command as US Indo-Pacific Command on 30 May 2018,14 the uncertainty with which 
the EU has approached the concept of an Indo-Pacific will likely, of necessity, shift to a 
clearer stance. As it does so, even if only conceptually at this stage, it will be important 
for the EU to better articulate its position on how the BRI sits within this concept. This 
will require a country-by-country mapping and analysis of how projects are unfolding.
12  Gon Jie, ‘1st Silk Road NGO Cooperation Network forum kicks off’, China Daily, 21 Nov. 2017.
13  European Union External Action Service (EEAS), Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger 
Europe, A Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy(EEAS: Brussels, June 
2016).
14  Copp, T., ‘INDOPACOM, it is: US Pacific Command gets renamed’, Military Times, 31 May 
2018
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Conclusion
Besides the capital necessary to get its ambitious programs off the ground, there are two 
greater problems with OBOR. The first is that even if China and the various countries it has 
identified as its Silk Road partners come up with the money, OBOR does not have a centralized 
organizing body or a strategic goal it is meant to accomplish beyond enriching all of Eurasia.15
Looking at the projects the Asian Infrastructure Bank has approved in recent months is 
telling: rehabilitating a hydropower plant in Tajikistan, investing in Indian infrastructure service 
companies with high growth, a highway project in Georgia, a dam improvement project in Indo-
nesia. Though they benefit local populations, they are all far-flung, one-off infrastructure projects 
that do not connect to form a new Silk Road and, thus, do nothing to increase Chinese power.
The second problem is that China’s main goal for OBOR is to accomplish what each 
successive Chinese leader has failed to do: distribute the wealth of the coast to the impoverished 
parts of China’s interior without destabilizing the country. China has chosen to dress its OBOR 
strategy in the raiment of the Silk Road, which to most of the world conjures up images of 
history and nostalgia for a simpler time. But that should not obscure the differences between 
the Silk Road and OBOR. The Silk Road was built on the exchange of goods between equally 
willing trading partners. China possessed silk. India possessed spices. The Romans and later the 
Europeans possessed silver and other precious metals. British historian Peter Frank pan estimates 
that in the 1st century nearly half the money produced by the mint of the Roman Empire was 
used to buy Chinese silk. The Silk Road was a constantly evolving marketplace that moved 
goods across a vast continent where they could be exchanged for other goods. And unlike today, 
Eurasia was the center of world civilization, home to the most important economies. 
That world is gone, and Eurasia is no longer what it was. China may be the world’s 
second largest economy, but the U.S. economy is still much larger. The U.S. is the largest 
consumer of Chinese exports and, just as importantly, it does not rely on exports for growth. 
The most concrete part of the OBOR action plan is how Chinese provinces are to profit from 
developments in infrastructure and increased trade. As the U.S.-based Center for Strategic 
and International Studies pointed out in a study published in March 2016, OBOR is not about 
China’s geopolitical ambitions, but rather about achieving two domestic economic objectives. 
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